ABSTRACT With the rapid development in mobile devices, mobile crowdsourcing has become an important research focus. In large-scale mobile crowdsourcing, the effective evolution prediction and incentive mechanism are the key focuses to improve the efficiency of systems. The evolution model based on evolutionary game theory is researched to predict the evolution trends of mobile crowdsourcing systems effectively. Based on the evolution trends, the reputation updating mechanism (RUMG) is proposed to address free-riding and false-reporting problems. According to spatio-temporal privacy preserving, the incentive mechanism with spatio-temporal privacy preserving for mobile crowdsourcing is researched. In order to protect worker's spatio-temporal privacy information effectively, a spatio-temporal privacy preserving based on k-anonymity (LKAC) is proposed. In addition, the effectivenesses of the proposed RUMG and LKAC are verified through comparison experiments. This proposed mechanism also improves the security of system and resolves the free-riding and false-reporting problems of mobile crowdsourcing.
I. INTRODUCTION
Today's mobile devices not only serve as communication devices, but also provide many sensors, such as GPS, accelerometer, gyroscope and so on [1] , [2] . With the development of cellular networks and smart terminals, mobile social networks (MSNs) emerges as a significant research focus. MSNs evolve from online social networks have extended universal and mobility features. In order to make MSNs adapt to the development of mobile devices, the concept of mobile crowdsourcing (spatio-temporal crowdsourcing) has emerged [3] . Mobile crowdsourcing refers to crowdsourcing tasks are performed by users who have mobile devices [4] . In mobile crowdsourcing, users upload their sensing data to MCSs [6] . For example, a data requester can create tasks to general public (participants) asking them to sense geo-tagged photos, collecting product prices, traffic information and so on, which generates big amount of data in MCSs [7] , [8] .
The existing mobile crowdsourcing faces serious practical challenges: how to design effective evolution model and incentive mechanisms to inspire workers to participate and perform well for sensing tasks. Therefore, designing a truthful evolution and incentive mechanism is yet another research focus to guarantee better performance results for mobile crowdsourcing. In workers' sensing applications, data originates from sensors controlled by workers, and any worker with an appropriately configured device can easily submit falsified data and hence data trustworthiness becomes more crucial than the traditional wireless sensor networks [9] - [11] . Compared with traditional wireless sensor networks (WSNs), users are easier to submit falsified data to platform in mobile crowdsourcing. Therefore, while establishing evolution and incentive mechanism, sensing data trustworthiness should be considered. For the mentioned reasons, how to inspire workers to participate sensing tasks and submit truthful data is crucial to improve the efficiency of large-scale mobile crowdsourcing.
In mobile crowdsourcing systems, inspiring workers to participate in tasks, and maximizing the profit of the system are the most important factors to guarantee the performance of mobile crowdsourcing systems [12] . According to present pricing schemes in mobile crowdsourcing, there are two main social dilemma problems.
1) Ex-ante: The requester pays rewards to workers before executing task and hence workers may prefer to pay few efforts to carry out the sensing task. This will result in the low quality of sensing data, which generate freeriding problem. 2) Ex-post: The requester pays rewards to workers after executing task. In this scenario, requesters may lie about the quality of sensing data in order to reduce the payments for workers. This price scheme results in false-reporting problem. In order to get rewards, users who have the corresponding client application will submit sensed data to mobile crowdsourcing platform [14] . One mobile crowdsourcing has the time property and space property, which generates complex networks properties [15] . However, when submitting sensed data, the spatio-temporal information will be tagged, and result in the leaking of personal privacy information. This globally accessible information poses a threat to the participants [16] . Private information indicates the information that an individual is unwilling to disclose. This information includes individual's behavior pattern, interests, physical condition and so on. Spatio-temporal privacy represents one's spatio-temporal information or other associated information (such as home address, working location and living habit) deduced from spatio-temporal information [17] , [18] . Therefore, privacy-preserving mechanism should insulate user's sensitive information, and prevent attackers from deducing other associated information through one's spatiotemporal information [13] . In conclusion, it is challenging to protect users' privacy and hence privacy-preserving in mobile crowdsourcing has become an important research focus [5] , [19] , [20] . In mobile crowdsourcing, the privacy-preserving can be divided as spatio-temporal privacy-preserving and identity privacy-preserving, which is shown in Fig.1 . In this paper, we research the spatio-temporal privacy-preserving emphatically in order to inspire privacy sensitive workers to participate tasks [21] . And we adopt the identity privacypreserving proposed by our previous proposed method [6] .
Therefore, the free-riding and false-reporting problems are eager to be solved effectively by an evolution and incentive mechanism. In addition, the spatio-temporal privacy also needs to be protected by effective privacy-preserving in mobile crowdsourcing, which can inspire the mobile users with high privacy-sensitivity to participate sensing tasks. To solve these problems, a truthful evolution and incentive mechanism with spatio-temporal privacy-preserving for largescale mobile crowdsourcing is proposed. The evolution trends of MCSs and reputation updating mechanism are researched in this paper to guarantee the security and performance of mobile crowdsourcing. In our paper, the contributions are shown as follows: 1) In order to predict the evolution trend of MCSs, the evolution model based on EGT is researched according to the ex-ante and ex-post cases respectively.
2) To maximize the social welfare in MCSs, the reputation management mechanism is investigated in accordance with free-riding and false-reporting problems. To consider the data trustworthiness, the reputation updating algorithm RUMG is designed based on EGT and social norm. 3) To assure the security, the spatio-temporal information is considered while designing spatio-temporal privacypreserving mechanism. Based on improved location k-anonymity, the spatio-temporal privacy-preserving is used in order to further protect worker's spatiotemporal privacy. In addition, we determine the value of k to revolve the tradeoff between service quality and privacy protection based on Stakelberg game. 4) Comparison experiments are done to show that the proposed mechanism achieves the anonymity and security objectives. We compare the proposed privacypreserving mechanism and reputation updating algorithm with some typical methods through simulations.
The experimental results show the advantages and improvements of the proposed methods. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The related works are presented in Section II. Section III introduces the proposed truthful evolution and incentive mechanism with spatio-temporal privacy-preserving. Section IV gives the simulations, experimental analysis and discussions. Finally, the conclusions of this paper are summarized in Section V.
II. RELATED WORK
In mobile crowdsourcing, participatory systems and opportunistic systems are two typical systems [22] . Mobile crowdsourcing refers to collect data from sensors that users need to have crowdsourcing applications. However, the user's privacy data will be leaked when crowdsourcing tasks regardless of the types of mobile crowdsourcing. Especially for the location-based crowdsourcing tasks, crowdsourcing platform poses higher risk to crowd workers. Because the data collected by users manually in opportunistic systems, it will pose higher privacy risk than participatory systems.
Singer and Mittal [23] has studied the auction mechanisms for crowdsourcing markets and incentive users for their extensive participation in homogeneous and heterogeneous jobs. The mechanisms can guarantee the truthfulness of participants through determining the optimal prices for crowdsourcing tasks under the budget constraints. Although these mechanisms are promising, security and privacy issues which are critical factors in mobile crowdsourcing, have not been researched effectively and hence might make them impractical in real-life complex scenarios. In the above mechanisms, the involved parties are assumed as honest. However, in order to maximize the utilities of individuals, they tend to behave selfishly, which thus submit untruthful data or pay less rewards. The authors of [24] - [26] leveraged traditional incentive mechanisms to solve users' selfish issues. However, they failed to consider the budget constraints of tasks as a critical practical constraint. According to this problem, the authors of [27] - [29] researched incentive mechanisms under the given budget constraints to solve the users' selfishness in mobile crowdsourcing. Li et al. [30] proposed a truthful incentive mechanism in order to prevent waste because of the geographical position conflicting. These incentive mechanisms can increase the participation ratio and guarantee the truthfulness of participants.
According to the evolution of mobile crowdsourcing, few works were proposed to analyze the evolution process for workers and requesters respectively. Most of incentive mechanisms cannot solve the both social dilemmas existing in mobile crowdsourcing. One social dilemma is called ex-ante, which indicates that workers are paid by platform before the task starts. Workers prefer to provide no effort to complete tasks, and get payments, which will generate free-riding problem. Another social dilemma is called ex-post, which indicates that the request pays for crowd workers after they complete corresponding micro-task. Thus, requesters prefer to refuse the payments in order to get more benefits, which will generate false-reporting problem [31] . Yin et al. [32] and Wang et al. [33] proposed the evolution model through combining EGT and biological model, which can solve the free-riding problem in MSNs.
In the aspect of communication security, especially for Denial of Service (DoS) attack [35] , many works have been proposed. According to the location privacy preserving strategies, the main methods include dummy location method [34] , [36] , spatio-temporal cloaking method [37] , [38] and spatial encryption method [39] . In order to protect user's location, dummy location method publishes a dummy location to the platform, i.e., the location privacy is protected through publishing a dummy location. Privacy preserving level and service quality are associated with the distance between dummy location and real location. As the distance between dummy location and real location gets farther, the service quality gets worse but the privacy preserving level increases. In summary, dummy location method has low computational cost and good service quality but also low privacy preserving level. Spatio-temporal cloaking method utilizes a spatial range to transmit instead of user's real location. k-anonymity preserving is the most typical technology in spatio-temporal cloaking method. Gedik and Liu [40] proposed a privacy-preserving framework based on k-anonymity for users with sensitive privacy requirements. The advantage of spatio-temporal cloaking method is that the service quality and privacy preserving achieve a good balance. However, it is difficult to achieve optimal anonymous for spatio-temporal cloaking method. In extreme case, the risk of privacy leak still exists [19] . Spatial encryption method achieves anonymous purpose through encrypting location. SpaceTransform [40] and PrivateQuery [41] technologies are two typical technologies in spatial encryption method. Spatial encryption method has better privacy preserving, but bigger processing cost. Zhang et al. [42] proposed a privacy-preserving participant coordination method BPS. In this scheme, each crowd worker reveals his real location to nearby workers, so that the platform cannot collect the trajectories of crowd workers.
A. SUMMARY
In the big data environment, we research the truthful evolution and incentive for large-scale mobile crowd sensing networks. In order to inspire workers to select truthful strategy, combining EGT and data trustworthiness, the evolution model and reputation management mechanism are researched in this paper. For inspire more privacy sensitive workers to participate tasks, we also design the spatio-temporal privacypreserving mechanism based on improve k-anonymity. The tradeoff between service quality and privacy protection is researched based on Stakelberg game.
III. THE TRUTHFUL EVOLUTION AND INCENTIVE MECHANISM
A mobile crowdsourcing includes three roles, i.e., requesters, platform and crowd workers. The architecture of a mobile crowdsourcing system is shown in Fig.2 . In the process of communications, we develop models for preserving the privacy of worker's identity and location information. Additionally, the tradeoff between privacy-preserving and service quality should be preserved in the proposed mechanism. The evolution model for MCSs is researched in this paper in order to predict and analyze the evolution process of MCSs. Based on the evolution result, the reputation management mechanism needs to be established in order to inspire the trustworthiness of crowd workers and improve the effectiveness of the system.
A. SYSTEM MODEL

Definition 1 (Crowdsourcing Tasks):
The crowdsourcing tasks are issued by task requesters, which are defined as = ϕ 1 , ϕ 2 , ..., ϕ j , ..., ϕ m , and ϕ j indicates the jth crowdsourcing task.
Definition 2 (Crowdsourcing Workers): Crowdsourcing workers indicate people who participate in crowdsourcing tasks, and are defined as W = (w 1 , w 2 , ..., w i , ..., w n ), and w i is the ith crowdsourcing worker.
In our system model, platform announces the crowdsourcing tasks for workers to select. For the selected task, w i has a contribution value v i > 0 to platform, and also has an associated private cost c i known only by himself. In this paper, w i 's bidding is represented by b i , which represents the required price for w i 's service that w i wants to sell. The sensing plan of w i is represented by t i , which indicates the number of time units that w i can provide the sensing service. For special task, if w i is interested it, he first submits b i and t i to platform. When receiving the biddings and sensing plans, the platform determines the winners and generates a winner set Win. Then, the payment p i for winner w i is determined by platform. Therefore, the utility of w i based on submitted sensing plan is shown by Eq.(1).
In real time, we define t i ≥ 0, and t i = 0 represents that the w i will not participate in the task. The cost of w i is determined by c i = τ × t i , where τ means the unit cost of workers, and 0 < τ < 1.
However, the value of c i may change at the end of sensing task. Therefore, the real utility of worker i after finish the task is shown by Eq.(2).
where c i represents the associated real cost and is formulated as c i = τ × t i , where t i indicates the real sensing time of w i . Based on the above equations, we calculate p i for both ex-ante and ex-post cases. p i is redefined as Eq. (3).
where T indicates the maximal sensing time for the task, B represents the budget of the task determined by the platform, and B T ≥ 1 . We determine the utility of requesterū by Eq.(4).
where V (Win) = i∈Win v i indicates the total benefit of requester, and P(Win) = i∈Win p i represents the total payments for workers. The contribution value v i means that w i brings to the requester, and it is determined based on the sensing time submitted by w i . For a given mobile crowdsourcing system, we propose the reputation updating algorithm RUMG for both ex-ante and ex-pose cases. In mobile crowdsourcing, the transaction is defined as: an interaction between one worker and the platform, which can be analyzed by asymmetric gift-giving game. Asymmetric gift-giving games are games where there are not identical strategy sets for both players. For example, the ultimatum game and similarly the dictator game have different strategies for each player. It is possible, however, for a game to have identical strategies for both players, yet be asymmetric [6] .
B. EX-ANTE EVOLUTION ANALYSIS AND REPUTATION UPDATING STRATEGY
In the case of ex-ante, according to the bidding and sensing plan of a worker, the platform determine whether accept the worker and make payment for him. However, because of the selfishness of individuals, workers intend to provide less or no effort on the task in order to get more benefit, which will decrease the utility of platform. Therefore, it will generate free-riding phenomenon.
According to [6] , q i is defined as the quality of w i 's sensing data, which is chosen from the strategy set (Trust, Distrust). In the strategy set, Trust indicates that the quality of the sensing data is high, i.e., the reported sensing data is truthful. Distrust indicates the quality of the sensing data is low. According to w i , the quality of its sensing data q i satisfies the condition: q ∈ [0, 1]. Therefore, we utilize asymmetric giftgiving game to analysis the game relationship between w i and the requester. The payoff matrix of a transaction is illustrated in Table 1 .
However, in real mobile crowdsourcing systems, it is unreasonable to determine the value of q i as absolute trust and absolute distrust. According to this problem, we analyze the behavior of workers based on multi-strategy game theory. In this paper, we define l i to be the trust level of w i 's sensing data, and l i ≥ 1. Therefore, in a case where w i is selected by the platform, benefit V i of the requester is calculated using Eq.(5).
For w i , his benefit is determined by Eq.(6).
In order to discuss this method in detail, we divide l i into four levels and the payoff matrix of a transaction is described in Table 2 . In this game payoff matrix, there are four levels (l i = 1, l i = 2, l i = 3, l i = 4) for workers to select, and two strategies (Select, No select) for requester to select. The mapping relationships between l i and q i are shown by Table 3 .
In Table 2 , when l i is bigger, the trust degree is lower, i.e., l i = 1 indicates that w i 's sensing report is most truthful, and l i = 4 means that the sensing report is most untruthful. From this game matrix, it can be seen that if w i performs untruthfully, he will be benefited. Therefore, workers prefer selecting distrustful strategy, which will generate free-riding phenomenon. Free-riding is defined as, an inherent feature for a given individual which maximizes individual's utility, and minimizes the utilities of other individuals. In mobile crowdsourcing systems, w i free-rides through providing a low cost (even no cost) after getting the payment, and the requester receives negative benefit.
In order to verify the free-riding phenomenon in a mobile crowdsourcing system, it is necessary to find the Evolutionary Stable Strategy (ESS) based on EGT. Firstly, we define some parameters to analyze the evolution trend of MCSs based on EGT. The total number of crowd workers is fixed in our evolution model. Let x l be the proportion of workers with trust level l, where l ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} and x 1 + x 2 + x 3 + x 4 = 1. Additionally, let U l be the expected benefit of a worker with trust level l, and U is the average excepted payoff for all workers in the mobile crowdsourcing system. In Table 2 , we can get 4 , where p indicates the fixed payment, and c means the real cost in the mobile crowdsourcing system. Therefore, the evolution models based on EGT for mobile crowdsourcing shown by Eq. (7).
where t represents the number of transactions, i.e., the evolution generation. t represents the updated time step, we set it as 1 in this paper. Eq.(7) describes the multi-strategy evolution model. It reflects the dynamic changing for different types of workers in the mobile crowdsouring system, as well as deduces the convergence status of the whole system. It is also used to determine ESS. In EGT, the ESS needs to satisfy F(x) = dx dt = 0 and F(x) < 0. From these two constraints, we can deduce that l = 4 is the ESS in this game shown by Table 2 . This confirms that the workers intend to select untruthful strategy resulting in free-riding phenomenon.
For solving the free-riding problem in MCSs, we design a reputation updating mechanism based on social norm. We update worker's reputation dynamically according to worker's performance in each time sensing task. Based on worker's historical performances and sensing report, we compute worker's reputation dynamically. We define r t i to indicate w i 's reputation after the tth sensing task. In addition, r max indicates the max reputation of workers in this mobile crowdsourcing system. With higher reputation, the worker is more truthful. On the other hand, if reputation is low then the worker is more untruthful. We define be the set of reputation thresholds for mobile crowdsourcing system, which is expressed as = {θ 0 , θ 1 , . . . , θ m }. The parameter θ 0 indicates the minimal reputation threshold of workers set by system, where θ 1 , . . . , θ m ≥ θ 0 and ∀θ i ∈ , 0 ≤ θ i ≤ 10. There exists a mapping between each individual θ and ϕ i.e., θ 1 → ϕ 1 , θ 2 → ϕ 2 , ..., θ m → ϕ m . In this paper, the reputation updating strategy is proposed based on social norm. For example, we will compute w i 's reputation after sensing the tth task. Let l t i be w i 's trust level after sensing the tth task. We still assume there are four trust levels for a given instance. The reputation updating strategies are shown in Eq. (8) . First, when l t i = 1, the reputation updating strategy is derived by Eq. (8) .
where θ t indicates ϕ t 's reputation threshold. In traditional reputation updating algorithm, there is one reputation threshold in systems. If worker behaves untruthfully in one task, he will be rejected by platform in future. However, under this mechanism, it is easy to cause excessive punishment to some potential truthful workers. Therefore, we set different reputation thresholds for different tasks in order to update workers' reputations dynamically. This mechanism will inspire workers to select truthful strategy, and avoid the excessive punishment problem.
C. EX-POST EVOLUTION ANALYSIS AND REPUTATION UPDATING STRATEGY
According to ex-post case, i.e., when the requester pays rewards to workers only after executing the given task. This case results in false-reporting phenomenon, i.e., requesters may lie about the quality of sensing data in order to reduce the payments for workers. If requester selects Pay strategy, the calculation method for payoffs for requesters and workers is same with the ex-ante case. However, if requester select No pay strategy, the calculation method for payoff of a requester is shown in Eq. (9) . The benefit of a worker is derived by using Eq.(10). Therefore, the multi-strategy payoff matrix between workers and requesters for one transaction is shown in Table 4 . In this multi-strategy payoff matrix, there are four levels (l i = 1, l i = 2, l i = 3, l i = 4) for workers to select, and two strategies (Pay, No pay) for requesters to select.
From Table 4 , we can see that requesters tend to select No pay strategy. In order to increase their benefits, requesters may reject to pay for workers, which generates falsereporting problem. We also build the evolution model to predict the evolutionary trend of the system. Let the proportion of requesters who select Pay strategy is x , and the proportion of requesters who select No pay strategy is y . Therefore, the evolution models for requesters who select Pay strategy and No pay strategy are derived using Eq. (11) and Eq. (12) respectively.
U P indicates the expected benefit of requesters who select Pay strategy, and U N is the expected benefit of requesters who select No pay strategy. The parameter U is the mean expected benefit of all the requesters in mobile crowdsourcing system. Therefore, according to w i , 2, 3, 4 x l · 1 e (l−1) · v, and U = x ·U P +y ·U N , where v and p are fixed benefit and payment in a mobile crowdsourcing system. We find the ESS based on EGT in the same way. Through discussing the conditions for ESS, we can determine the No pay strategy is the ESS in this game as shown in Table 4 . This result shows that requesters intend to select No pay strategy in order to increase their benefits, which results in falsereporting phenomenon.
In order to resolve the false-reporting problem exists in MCSs, we also design the reputation updating mechanism for requesters. We update requester's reputation dynamically according to requester's performance after completing one sensing task. Let R t j be requester j's reputation after his tth requested task. R max is the max reputation of requesters in this mobile crowdsourcing system. When analyzing requesters' reputation, the tasks need to be divided into different categories (e.g., sensing indoor maps, sensing road conditions and so on). The set of task categories is expressed by¯ = { 1 , 2 , . . . , k } which indicates that there are k-category tasks in this mobile crowdsourcing system. According to different categories of tasks, we generate various corresponding reputation thresholds, which is defined by¯ = θ 0 ,θ 1 , . . . ,θ k . The parameterθ 0 is the minimal reputation threshold of requesters set by system, i.e.,θ 1 , . . . ,θ k ≥θ 0 , and ∀θ i ∈¯ , 0 ≤θ i ≤ 10. Mapping also exists between and¯ . According to the requesters who give the right rewards, their behavior is truthful. On the contrary, requesters who does not provide right rewards are considered to be untruthful. Therefore, let Q t j be the trust property of requester j in his tth requested task. We define Q t j shown by Eq. (13) .
Based on social norm, the reputation updating strategy is calculated as shown in Eq. (14), as shown at the bottom of this page. Different from traditional reputation updating method, the proposed reputation updating strategy can solve the unfair problem. By setting different reputation thresholds for different categories of tasks, it can inspire potential truthful requesters to behave truthfully.
D. SPATIO-TEMPORAL PRIVACY-PRESERVING MECHANISM
Worker's spatio-temporal information need to be protected further in order to hide his accurate position in mobile crowdsourcing. In this paper, we apply personalized location k-anonymity to protect worker's spatio-temporal information. According to the location information l i of w i , the spatiotemporal anonymity server transforms each message received from w i into a perturbed message L i . Therefore, it is able to be safely forwarded to the location-based Service (LBS) provider. We denote the set of spatio-temporal information received from workers as S. According to w i , his location information l i in set S is shown as follows.
This location information l i contains following contents: t i , x i and y i denote the 3D spatial and temporal location point of the message from w i . The coordinate (x i , y i ) indicates the spatial position of w i in the 2D space, and the time stamp t i means the time point that w i works at that position. The parameter k indicates the minimum anonymity level, where k ≥ 1. When k = 1, it means that the anonymity is not required according to the location information. When k > 1, it indicates that there are k perturbed messages be assigned in a spatio-temporal cloaking box, thus, the location message cannot be distinguished. Thus, larger k values indicate higher privacy sensibility. In addition, d t i , d x i and d y i represent the spatio-temporal tolerance for the maximum distance away from t i , x i and y i in one spatio-temporal cloaking box. These three parameters are determined by workers' preferences with regard to the quality of service (QoS). Larger spatio-temporal tolerance indicates less accurate results for worker's location. Similarly, larger temporal tolerance indicates higher latencies of worker's location information. According to spatio-temporal tolerance, the cloaking intervals should be
In this paper, we define B con (l i ) as the spatio-temporal constraint box for w i 's location information, where
For protecting worker's location information, we define L i as the perturbed or anonymous location information. In this
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paper, T represents the set of perturbed location information. According to w i , his perturbed or anonymous location information L i in set S is shown as follows:
According to l i and L i , there exists mapping between them which is represented as
. In this mechanism, l i in S and L i in T satisfy the following properties according to w i 's location information.
1) Spatial containment:
. Spatial containment and temporal containment signify that the spatio-temporal cloaking box B clo (L i ) contains the real position of w i : (t i , x i , y i ). Spatial and temporal resolu-
According to the above analysis, we can denote that this mechanism is location k-anonymity. Its requirement demands that, for the perturbed location information L i = R (l i ) of w i , there are at least k − 1 other workers' location information in the same spatio-temporal cloaking box. However, if the location k-anonymity is applied in the mobile crowdsourcing system, the worker cannot be associated with the point x because of the location perturbation. Point x is included in the spatio-temporal cloaking box, so the linking attack is not effective in this mechanism. Therefore, if an attacker can infer the approximate routes, he cannot link the identity binding with one of the routes. The reason is that a point x links with other different location information (e.g., five location information totally), so the distinguished probability is: k −1 = 0.2. By applying this mechanism, attacker cannot associate location information with the right worker. Therefore, this mechanism is location k-anonymity.
Because in mobile crowdsourcing, the privacy protection and service quality are two contradictory problems, we should solve the tradeoff between workers' privacypreserving and service quality. Therefore, how to determine the value of k is the key problem in real applications. The determination for k depends on the types of mobile crowdsourcing, e.g., some mobile crowdsourcing systems need to know workers' spatio-temporal information to assign sensing tasks, thus if the privacy degree is high, it is hard to assign suited tasks for workers. In this section, we determine the value of k based on Stackelberg game.
According to the utilities of workers and platform, we give the utility functions shown by Eq. (15) and Eq.(16). Eq. (5) shows the utility function of workers through gaming with platform presented by U w , where α indicates the marginal demand factor that relates with worker's privacy information quantity obtained by platform. χ indicates the loss because of privacy leaking, and χ max is the maximal loss defined by system. ρ is the ratio of worker's money loss because of privacy leaking, and P l represents the probability of data leaking. From Eq.(15), it can be seen that with the increasing of k, the obtained service quality will decrease correspondingly. The first part of Eq. (15) indicates the income because the worker provides privacy information. The second part of Eq. (15) expresses the loss because of data leaked.
Eq. (16) shows the utility function of platform through gaming with workers presented by U p , where C represents the cost that platform invested for privacy protection. According to Eq.(16), the first part shows the income because the platform provides service. The second part says the security cost, and the last part presents the loss because of data leaked. (16) In order to get Nash equilibrium strategy, we need to compute partial derivatives for Eq. (15) and Eq. (16) . Based on Stackelberg game, the value of k could be determined, i.e., the Nash equilibrium strategy is the appropriate value of k.
E. SECURITY AND TRUTHFULNESS ANALYSIS
In this paper, we also analyze the security and truthfulness of the proposed mechanism.
Proposition 1: Other workers and platform cannot see the worker's accurate spatio-temporal information.
The improved spatio-temporal k-anonymity which is applied in our mechanism, which will perturb worker's spatio-temporal information with the same spatio-temporal cloaking box. Therefore, for the worker's accurate spatiotemporal information, other users cannot deduce it.
Proposition 2: The proposed evolution and incentive are truthful.
Based on the evolution analysis, we establish the corresponding reputation updating algorithm to inspire workers to select Trust strategy, and requesters to select Pay strategy. Once they behave untruthful, they will be punished and not be selected for future tasks. Thus, in order to get more benefit, participants will select truthful strategies to be their optimal strategies. According to the above analysis, the proposed evolution and incentive are truthful.
IV. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we design comparison experiments to verify the effectiveness of the proposed evolution and incentive mechanism. Firstly, in order to evaluate the performance of the proposed RUMG, we design the simulation experiments to predict the evolution trend of the whole system, and verify the effectiveness of the reputation updating algorithm. Then, we utilize the data sets of mobility traces of taxis in Beijing and New York to verify the effectiveness of the proposed privacy-preserving scheme. In the two data sets, we extract the traces of approximately 2000 taxis during 10 minutes. Each trajectory data includes following information: id, position and time stamp. Fig.3(a) shows the traces of taxi cabs in Beijing, and the traces of taxi cabs in New York are described by Fig.3(b) .
All the experiments were conducted on Matlab 7.0 simulation platform. All the experiments are averaged over 100 instances, and executed as event-based simulations. Each measurement is averaged over 50 instances. The experimental settings are shown in Table 5 . 
A. EVALUATION RESULTS ANALYSIS FOR REPUTATION UPDATING STRATEGY
In this experiment, we simulate the free-riding phenomenon according to the payoff game matrix shown in Table 2 . Then, we conduct the comparison experiments to evaluate the effectiveness and adaptation of the proposed RUMG.
1) EX-ANTE EXPERIMENTS
According to the payoff matrix in Table 2 , we verify the freeriding phenomenon generates in the mobile crowdsourcing system. Fig.4 shows the simulated free-riding problem for exante, where x-coordinate indicates evolutionary generations, and y-coordinate represents the proportions of different trust levels. Therefore, the evolution trends of the four trust levels in case of ex-ante are shown by Fig.4.(a) , and the initial proportions for four strategies are all 0.25 respectively. From Fig.4.(a) , we can see that workers prefer to select untruthful strategy (l i =4) with the evolution of system, which generates free-riding phenomenon. We also evaluate that the evolution trends of truthful individuals (l i = 1) with different initial proportions, as shown in Fig.4.(b) . It shows that when x 1 ≤ 0.3, the system will generate free-riding phenomenon, i.e., workers tend to select selfish strategy.
In order to evaluate the effectiveness and adaptation of the proposed RUMG, we compare it with the traditional reputation updating algorithm based on social norm [31] and the truthful online reputation updating algorithm (TORU) [6] . In the experimental settings, the initial number of truthful individuals are fixed to 100, and the transactions are performed 25 times. The experimental results are shown by Fig.5 , where x-coordinate expresses the transaction time sequence, and the number of truthful individuals is shown by y-coordinate. From the Fig.5 , we can infer that the proposed RUMG performs better than the traditional social norm and TORU algorithms. Because of the unique reputation threshold defined in the traditional social norm algorithm, some potential truthful workers are punished excessively, i.e., they are deselected by platform. But the algorithms TORU and RUMG with multiple thresholds can resolve excessive punishment problem, so that workers perform better. Compared with TORU algorithm, more workers selected truthful strategy under RUMG algorithm. Because of the multi-strategy game theory proposed in RUMG, this method has been proven for its better adaptation and effectiveness. 
2) EX-POST EXPERIMENTS
According to the payoff matrix in Table 3 , we verify the false-reporting problem in mobile crowdsourcing system. The simulation results are shown in Fig.6 , where x-coordinate indicates evolutionary generations, and y-coordinate is the proportions for Pay strategy and No Pay strategy. In Fig.6.(a) , the initial proportions for two strategies are 0.5 and 0.5 respectively. From the results, we can see that requesters tend to select No Pay strategy with the evolution of system. That is disregard to the truthful data uploaded by the workers, requesters will select No Pay strategy in order to maximize their benefits. This generates false-reporting problem in the mobile crowdsourcing system. Fig.6.(b) shows the evolution trends of Pay strategy with different initial proportions. From Fig.6.(b) , it can be seen that when x ≤ 0.6, the system will generate false-reporting phenomenon, i.e., requesters tend to select selfish strategy.
In the case of ex-post, the effectiveness and adaptation of the proposed RUMG are also be compared with the traditional social norm algorithm [31] . In experimental settings, the initial number of truthful individuals are fixed as 50, and the transactions perform 20 times. The comparison results are shown by Fig.7 , which can be seen that the proposed RUMG performs better than traditional social norm algorithm. Because of the multiple thresholds, RUMG can resolve the excessive punishment problem effectively.
B. EVALUATION METRICS AND RESULTS ANALYSIS FOR PRIVACY
In this paper, we adopt the evaluation metrics based on entropy theory to evaluate the privacy-preserving mechanism [44] . Let X be the set of selected workers. We denote that in a time slot T , w i has uploaded a total amount of data is d i . The total amount of data collected is denoted as D T (X ). Consider that we have D pieces of uploaded data that are tagged with locations, privacy is maximized (i.e., the entropy is maximized) if the platform identifies the workers with the same probability of uploading a piece of data. Therefore, it is hard to identify the owner of this data for the platform. The privacy level depends on the distribution of the probabilities for the D pieces of uploaded data tagged. Let H (X ) be the privacy degree provided by selecting X . The evaluation method for privacy degree is shown in Eq. (17) .
We compare our proposed privacy-preserving mechanism for locations, referred as LKAC in figure, with the random selection method and BPS method proposed in [42] . Through the above evaluation metrics, the comparison result for privacy levels with different budgets on Beijing data set is shown in Fig.8 . In this experiment, x-coordinate represents different budget amounts, and y-coordinate indicates privacy levels. Based on the experimental result, it can be inferred that the privacy levels increase with the increase in budget. When compared with random selection method and BPS method, the proposed LKAC method has higher privacy level. However, at lower budget privacy levels of BPS and proposed LKAC methods are close. As the budget increases, proposed LKAC method shows superior levels of privacy over BPS and random methods. According to the data set of mobility traces of taxi cabs in New York, we also design comparison experiment for privacy levels with different budgets. The comparison result on New York data set is shown in Fig.9 . From Fig.9 , we can infer that the proposed LKAC has better privacy-preserving performance through compared with BPS method and random selection method. We have designed three groups of experiments to compare privacy levels as the number of participants varies. The numbers of participants are divided into 50, 100 and 150 by using clustering while the budget is fixed. The comparison result for privacy levels with different numbers of participants on Beijing data set is shown in Fig.10 . From this result, it can be seen that the privacy level of the proposed LKAC can achieve a maximum level of 7 when the number of participants is 150. In conclusion, the proposed LKAC performs best on privacy level when compared with random method and BPS method.
We also verify the effectiveness of the proposed LKAC utilizing New York data set. The comparison result for privacy levels with different numbers of participants on New York data set is shown in Fig.11 . According to different numbers of participants, it can be seen that the proposed LKAC has better privacy-preserving level through compared with other two methods.
V. CONCLUSION
With the rapid development of the market of MCSs, many applications and incentive methods are researched. In the large-scale mobile crowd sensing networks, we proposed a truthful evolution and incentive mechanism in order to predict the evolution trends of MCSs accurately, and give effective incentive mechanism for improving the efficiency of the MCSs. According to the free-riding and false-reporting problems, the evolution model is researched based on EGT. The corresponding reputation updating algorithm, RUMG, is researched. For protecting workers' spatio-temporal information, the LKAC method based on k-anonymity is proposed. The tradeoff between privacy protection and service quality is researched based on Stakelberg game in this paper. The effectiveness and adaptation of the proposed truthful evolution and incentive mechanism is verified effectively through comparison experiments. Security of the system is improved, and the free-riding and false-reporting problems are resolved under the proposed evolution and incentive mechanism.
In future works, we will further research the tradeoff between privacy protection and service quality in order to inspire workers to participate sensing tasks effectively.
ZHONGYANG CHI received the bachelor's degree in communication engineering from Chongqing Jiaotong University. He is currently pursuing the master's degree in computer and control engineering with Yantai University. His research interests are mobile computing and privacy protection.
XIANGRONG TONG received the Ph.D. degree in computer science and technology from Beijing Jiaotong University. He is currently a Full Professor with Yantai University. He has published more than 30 papers in well-known journals and conferences. His research interests are computer science, intelligent information processing, and social networks. In addition, he has presided and joined three national projects and three provincial projects. VOLUME 6, 2018 
